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Abstract. Embedded exponentiation techniques have become a key
concern for security and efficiency in hardware devices using public key
cryptography. An exponentiation is basically a sequence of multiplica-
tions and squarings, but this sequence may reveal exponent bits to an
attacker on an unprotected implementation. Although this subject has
been covered for years, we present in this paper new exponentiation al-
gorithms based on trading multiplications for squarings. Our method
circumvents attacks aimed at distinguishing squarings from multiplica-
tions at a lower cost than previous techniques. Last but not least, we
present new algorithms using two parallel squaring blocks which provide
the fastest exponentiation to our knowledge.
Keywords: Public key cryptography, exponentiation, long integer arith-
metic, side-channel analysis, atomicity.
1 Introduction
Nowadays most embedded devices implementing public key cryptography use
RSA [16] for encryption and signature schemes, or cryptographic primitives over
(Fp,×) such as DSA [7] and the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [6]. All
these algorithms require the computation of modular exponentiations. Since the
emergence of the so-called side-channel analysis, embedded devices implement-
ing these cryptographic algorithms must be protected against a wider and wider
class of attacks.
Moreover, the cost and timing constraints are crucial in many applications
of embedded devices (e.g. banking, transport, etc.). This often requires cryp-
tographic implementors to choose the best compromise between security and
speed. Improving the efficiency of algorithms or countermeasures generates thus
a lot of interest in the industry.
An exponentiation is generally processed using a sequence of multiplications,
some of them having different operands and some of them being squarings. In
[2], Amiel et al. showed that this distinction can provide exploitable side-channel
leakages to an attacker. Classical countermeasures consist of using exponentia-
tion algorithms where the sequence of multiplications and squarings does not
depend on the secret exponent.
Our contribution is to propose a new exponentiation scheme using squarings
only, which is faster than the classical countermeasures. Also, we introduce new
algorithms having a particularly low cost when two squarings can be parallelized.
This paper is organized as follow: in Section 2 we recall classical exponentia-
tion algorithms and present some well-known side-channel attacks and counter-
measures. Then we propose our new countermeasure in Section 3 and study its
efficiency from the parallelization point of view in Section 4. Finally we present
some practical results in Section 5 and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Background on Exponentiation on Embedded Devices
We recall in this section some classical exponentiation algorithms. First we
present the square-and-multiply algorithms upon which are based most of the
exponentiation methods. Then we introduce the side-channel analysis and in
particular the simple power analysis (SPA). We present some algorithms im-
mune to this attack, and we finally recall a particular side-channel attack aimed
at distinguishing squarings from multiplications in an exponentiation operation.
2.1 Square-and-Multiply Algorithms
Many exponentiation algorithms have been proposed in the literature. Among
the numerous references an interested reader can refer for instance to [14] for
details. Alg. 2.1 and Alg. 2.2 are two variants of the classical square-and-multiply
algorithm which is the simplest approach to compute an RSA exponentiation.
Alg. 2.1 Left-to-Right Square-and-Multiply Exponentiation
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2
Output: md mod n
1: a← 1
2: for i = k − 1 to 0 do
3: a← a2 mod n
4: if di = 1 then
5: a← a×m mod n
6: return a
Considering a balanced exponent d, these algorithms require on average 1S+
0.5M per bit of exponent to perform the exponentiation – S being the cost of
a modular squaring and M the cost of a modular multiplication. It is generally
considered in the literature – and corroborated by our experiments – that on
cryptographic coprocessors S ≈ 0.8M .
These algorithms are no longer used in embedded devices for security appli-
cations since the emergence of the side-channel analysis.
Alg. 2.2 Right-to-Left Square-and-Multiply Exponentiation
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2
Output: md mod n
1: a← 1 ; b← m
2: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
3: if di = 1 then
4: a← a× b mod n
5: b← b2 mod n
6: return a
2.2 Side-Channel Analysis on Exponentiation
Side-channel analysis was introduced in 1996 by Kocher in [12] and completed
in [13]. Many attacks have been derived in the following years.
On one hand, passive attacks rely on the following physical property: a micro-
processor is physically made of thousands of logical gates switching differently de-
pending on the executed operations and on the manipulated data. Therefore the
power consumption and the electromagnetic radiation, which depend on those
gates switchings, reflect and may leak information on the executed instructions
and the manipulated data. Consequently, by monitoring such side-channels of a
device performing cryptographic operations, an observer may infer information
on the implementation of the program executed and on the – potentially secret
– data involved.
On the other hand, active attacks intend to physically tamper with compu-
tations and/or stored values in memories. Such effects are generally obtained
using clock or power glitches, laser beam, etc.
Finally some works [1] have highlighted the fact that passive and active
attacks may be combined to threaten implementations applying countermeasures
against both of them but not against their simultaneous use.
In the remainder of this section we focus on two passive attacks : the SPA
presented hereafter with classical countermeasures, and a particular analysis
from [2] discussed in Section 2.3.
Simple Power Analysis Simple side-channel analysis [11] consists in observ-
ing a difference of behavior depending on the value of the secret key on the
component performing cryptographic operations by using a single measurement.
In the case of an exponentiation, the original SPA is based on the fact that,
if the squaring operation has a different pattern than a multiplication, the se-
cret exponent can be directly read on the curve. For instance, in Alg. 2.1, a 0
exponent bit implies a squaring to be followed by another squaring, while a 1 bit
causes a multiplication to follow a squaring. Classical countermeasures consist
of using regular algorithms or applying the atomicity principle, as detailed in
the following.
Alg. 2.3 Montgomery Ladder Exponentiation
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2
Output: md mod n
1: R0 ← 1 ; R1 ← m
2: for i = k − 1 to 0 do
3: R1−di ← R0 ×R1 mod n
4: Rdi ← Rdi2 mod n
5: return R0
Alg. 2.4 Left-to-Right Multiply Always Exponentiation
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2
Output: md mod n
1: R0 ← 1 ; R1 ← m ; i← k − 1 ; t← 0
2: while i ≥ 0 do
3: R0 ← R0 ×Rt mod n
4: t← t⊕ di ; i← i− 1 + t [⊕ is bitwise XOR]
5: return R0
Regular Algorithms These algorithms include the well known square-and-
multiply always and Montgomery ladder algorithms [15,10]. The latter is pre-
sented hereafter in Alg. 2.3. It is generally preferred over the square-and-multiply
always method since it does not involves dummy multiplications which makes it
naturally immune to the C safe-error attacks [18,10].
Such regular algorithms perform one squaring and one multiplication at every
iteration and thus require 1M + 1S per exponent bit.
Atomicity Principle This method, presented by Chevallier-Mames et al. in [4],
can be applied to protect the square-and-multiply algorithm against the SPA. It
yields the so-called multiply always algorithm, since all squarings are performed
as classical multiplications. We present a left-to-right multiply always algorithm
in Alg. 2.4.
The interest of the multiply always algorithm is its better performances com-
pared to the regular ones. Indeed it performs an exponentiation using on average
1.5M per exponent bit.
2.3 Distinguishing Squarings from Multiplications
Amiel et al. showed in [2] that the average Hamming weight of the output of a
multiplication x× y has a different distribution whether:
– the operation is a squaring performed using the multiplication routine, i.e.
x = y, x uniformly distributed in [0, 2k − 1],
– or the operation is an “actual” multiplication, i.e. x and y independent and
uniformly distributed in [0, 2k − 1].
This attack can thus target an atomic implementation such as Alg. 2.4 where
the same multiplication operation is used to perform x× x and x× y.
First, many exponentiation curves using a fixed exponent but variable data
have to be acquired and averaged. Then, considering the average curve, the
aim of the attack is to reveal if two consecutive operations are identical – i.e.
two squarings – or different – i.e. a squaring and a multiplication. As in the
classical SPA, two consecutive squarings reveal that a 0 bit has been manipulated
whereas a squaring followed by a multiplication reveals a 1 bit. This information
is obtained using the above-mentioned leakage by subtracting the parts of the
average curve corresponding to two consecutive operations: peaks occur if one
is a squaring and the other is a multiplication while subtracting two squarings
should produce only noise. It is worth noticing that no particular knowledge on
the underlying hardware implementation is needed which in practice increases
the strength of this analysis.
A classical countermeasure against this attack is the randomization of the
exponent4, i.e. d∗ ← d+ rϕ(n), r being a random value. The result is obtained
as md mod n = md
∗
mod n.
In spite of the possibility to apply the exponent randomization, this attack
brings into light an intrinsic flaw of the multiply always algorithm: the fact that
at some instant a multiplication performs a squaring (x × x) or not (x × y)
depending on the exponent. In the rest of this paper we propose new atomic
algorithms that are exempt from this weakness.
3 Square Always Countermeasure
We present in this section new exponentiation algorithms which simultaneously
benefit from efficiency of the atomicity principle and immunity against the afore-
mentioned weakness of the multiply always method.
3.1 Principle
It is well known that a multiplication can be performed using squarings only.
Therefore we propose the following countermeasure which consists in using either
expression (1) or (2) to perform all the multiplications in the exponentiation.
Combined with the atomicity principle, this countermeasure completely prevents
the attack described in Section 2.3 since only squarings are performed.
x× y = (x+ y)
2 − x2 − y2
2
(1)
x× y =
(
x+ y
2
)2
−
(
x− y
2
)2
(2)
4 Notice however that the randomization of the message has no effect on this attack,
or even makes it easier by providing the required data variability.
At the first glance, (1) requires three squarings to perform a multiplication
whereas (2) requires only two. Further analysis reveals however that using (1)
or (2) in Alg. 2.1 and 2.2 has always the cost of replacing multiplications by
twice more squarings. Indeed, notice that in the multiplication a ← a × m of
Alg. 2.1 m is a constant operand. Therefore implementing a×m using (1) yields
y = m, thus m2 mod n can be computed only once at the beginning of the
exponentiation. The cost of computing y2 can then be neglected.
This trick does not apply to Alg. 2.2 since no operand is constant in step 4.
However b ← b2 is the following operation. Using equation (1) in Alg. 2.2 then
yields to store t← y2 and save the following squaring: b← t. The resulting cost
is thus equivalent as trading one multiplication for two squarings.
Remark In our context, (1) or (2) refer to operations modulo n. Notice however
that divisions by 2 in these equations require neither inversion nor multiplication.
For example, we recommend computing z/2 mod n in the following atomic way:
t0 ← z
t1 ← z + n
α← z mod 2
return tα/2
3.2 Atomic Algorithms
Trading multiplications for squarings in Alg. 2.1 and 2.2 just requires to apply
formula (1) or (2) at step 5 in Alg. 2.1 or step 4 in Alg. 2.2. However the
resulting algorithms would still present a leakage since different operations would
be performed when processing a 0 or 1 bit. Hence it is necessary to apply the
atomicity principle on these algorithms.
This step is achieved by identifying a minimal pattern of operations to be
performed on each loop iteration and rewrite the algorithms using this pattern.
For the considered algorithms, the minimal pattern should obviously contain a
single squaring since it is the only operation required by the processing of a
0 bit and performing dummy squarings would lessen the performances of the
algorithm. An addition, subtraction and division by 2 should also be present
to compute formulas (1) or (2). Finally some more operations are required to
manage the loop counter and the pointer on exponent bits.
Algorithm 3.1 presented hereafter details how to implement atomically the
square always method in a left-to-right exponentiation using equation (1).
As in [4] we use a matrix for a more readable and efficient implementation:
M =

1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 1
2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 0
1 1 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
3 3 3 0 3 3 1 1 3 1

The main loop of Alg. 3.1 can be viewed as a four state machine where each
row j of M define the operands of the atomic pattern. The atomic pattern itself is
Alg. 3.1 Left-to-Right Square Always Exponentiation with (1)
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2
Output: md mod n
1: R0 ← 1 ; R1 ← m ; R2 ← 1 ; R3 ← m2/2 mod n
2: j ← 0 ; i← k − 1
3: while i ≥ 0 do
4: RMj,0 ← RMj,1 + RMj,2 mod n
5: RMj,3 ← RMj,32 mod n
6: RMj,4 ← RMj,5/2 mod n
7: RMj,6 ← RMj,7 −RMj,8 mod n
8: j ← di(1 + (j mod 3))
9: i← i−Mj,9
10: return R0
given by the content of the loop, i.e. steps 4 to 9. An exponent bit di is processed
by the state j = 0 (resp. j = 3) if the previous bit di+1 is a 0 (resp. a 1). This
state is followed by the processing of the next bit if di = 0, or by the states
j = 1 and j = 2 if di = 1. For more clarity, we present below the four sequences
of operations corresponding to each state. The dummy operations are identified
by a ?.
j = 0
(di = 0 or 1)
R1 ← R1 + R1 mod n ?
R0 ← R02 mod n
R2 ← R1/2 mod n ?
R1 ← R1 −R2 mod n ?
j ← di [? if di = 0]
i← i− (1− di) [? if di = 1]
j = 2
(di = 1)
R1 ← R1 + R3 mod n ?
R0 ← R02 mod n
R0 ← R0/2 mod n
R0 ← R2 −R0 mod n
j ← 3
i← i− 1
j = 1
(di = 1)
R2 ← R0 + R1 mod n
R2 ← R22 mod n
R2 ← R2/2 mod n
R2 ← R2 −R3 mod n
j ← 2
i← i ?
j = 3
(di = 0 or 1)
R3 ← R3 + R3 mod n ?
R0 ← R02 mod n
R3 ← R3/2 mod n ?
R1 ← R1 −R3 mod n ?
j ← di
i← i− (1− di) [? if di = 1]
We also present in Alg. 3.2 a right-to-left variant of the square always expo-
nentiation using equation (2). This algorithm requires the following matrix:
M =

0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1
2 1 2 2 1 0 1 0
0 2 1 1 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1

Alg. 3.2 Right-to-Left Square Always Exponentiation with (2)
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2
Output: md mod n
1: R0 ← m ; R1 ← 1 ; R2 ← 1
2: i← 0 ; j ← 0
3: while i ≤ k − 1 do
4: j ← di(1 + (j mod 3))
5: RMj,0 ← RMj,1 + R0 mod n
6: RMj,2 ← RMj,3/2 mod n
7: RMj,4 ← RMj,5 −RMj,6 mod n
8: RMj,3 ← RMj,32 mod n
9: i← i + Mj,7
10: return R1
As for the previous algorithm, the main loop of Alg. 3.2 has four states. Here,
the state j = 0 corresponds to the processing a 0 bit and the sequence j = 1,
j = 2, and j = 3 corresponds to the processing of a 1 bit, as detailed below.
j = 0
(di = 0)
j ← 0 [? if j was 0]
R0 ← R0 + R0 mod n ?
R2 ← R0/2 mod n ?
R0 ← R0 −R2 mod n ?
R0 ← R02 mod n
i← i + 1
j = 2
(di = 1)
j ← 2
R0 ← R2 + R0 mod n ?
R1 ← R1/2 mod n
R0 ← R0 −R2 mod n ?
R1 ← R12 mod n
i← i ?
j = 1
(di = 1)
j ← 1
R2 ← R1 + R0 mod n
R2 ← R2/2 mod n
R1 ← R0 −R1 mod n
R2 ← R22 mod n
i← i ?
j = 3
(di = 1)
j ← 3
R0 ← R0 + R0 mod n ?
R0 ← R0/2 mod n ?
R1 ← R2 −R1 mod n
R0 ← R02 mod n
i← i + 1
3.3 Performance Analysis
Algorithms 3.1 and 3.2 are mostly equivalent in terms of operations realized in
a single loop. The number of dummy operations (additions, subtractions and
halvings) introduced to fill the atomic blocks are the same in the two versions –
it is generally considered that the cost of these operations is negligible compared
to multiplications and squarings. Both algorithms require 2S per exponent bit
on average or 1.6M if S/M = 0.8 which represents a theoretical 11.1% speed-up
over Alg. 2.3 which is the fastest known regular algorithm immune to the attack
from [2]. Table 1 compares the efficiency of the multiply always, Montgomery
ladder, and square always algorithms when S = M and S/M = 0.8.
In addition, our algorithms can be enhanced using the sliding window or
m-ary exponentiation techniques [14,9] while the Montgomery ladder cannot.
These techniques are known to provide a substantial speed-up on Alg. 2.4 when
extra memory is available. Though we did not investigate this path, we believe
that a comparable trade-off between space and time can be expected.
Table 1. Comparison of the expected cost of SPA protected exponentiation algorithms
(including the multiply always which is not immune to the attack from [2])
Algorithm General cost S/M = 1 S/M = 0.8 # registers
Multiply always (Alg. 2.4) 1.5M 1.5M 1.5M 2
Montgomery ladder (Alg. 2.3) 1M + 1S 2M 1.8M 2
L.-to-r. Square always (Alg. 3.1) 2S 2M 1.6M 4
R.-to-l. Square always (Alg. 3.2) 2S 2M 1.6M 3
3.4 Security Considerations
Our algorithms are protected against the SPA by the implementation of the
atomicity principle. The analysis from [2] cannot apply either since only squar-
ings are involved. As a matter of comparison, notice that the exponent blind-
ing countermeasure does not fundamentally remove the source of the leakage
but only renders this attack practically infeasible. Embedded implementations
should also be protected against the differential power analysis (DPA) which
we do not detail in this study. However it is worth noticing that classical DPA
countermeasures, like exponent or modulus randomization, can be applied as
well. The interested reader may refer to [13,5].
We recommend implementing Alg. 3.2 instead of Alg. 3.1 since left-to-right
algorithms are vulnerable to the chosen message SPA and doubling attack [8],
and more subject to combined attacks [1]. Besides, Alg. 3.2 requires one less
register than Alg. 3.1.
It is well-known that algorithms using dummy operations generally succumb
to safe-error attacks. Immunity to C and M safe-errors can be easily obtained by
applying the exponent randomization technique, which also prevent the DPA.
Nevertheless, special care has been taken in our algorithms to ensure that induc-
ing a fault in any of the dummy operations would produce an erroneous result.
For instance, in the following sequence of dummy operations in Alg. 3.2 (j = 0),
no operation can be tampered with without corrupting R0 and thus the result
of the exponentiation:
R0 ← R0 + R0 mod n
R2 ← R0/2 mod n
R0 ← R0 −R2 mod n
Only operations i ← i and j ← 0, appearing in some instances of Alg. 3.1
and 3.2 patterns, have not been protected for readability reasons. It is easy to
fix these points: perform i← i±Mj,·+α instead of i← i±Mj,· in Alg. 3.1 and
3.2 and add a step i← i− α in the loop. The j ← di(1 + . . . ) operation should
be protected in the same manner. In the end, our algorithms are immune to C
safe-error attacks.
Further work may focus on implementing on our algorithms the infective
computation strategy presented by Schmidt et al. in [17] in order to counterfeit
the combined attacks.
4 Parallelization
It is well known that the Montgomery ladder algorithm is well suited for par-
allelization. It is thus natural to ask if the square always algorithms have the
same property. For example the two squarings needed to perform a classical mul-
tiplication using equation (2) are independent and can therefore be performed
simultaneously. The same strategy applies for equation (1).
We believe that the interest of this section extends beyond the scope of
embedded systems. Nowadays most of computers are provided with several pro-
cessors which enables using parallelized algorithms to speed-up computations.
4.1 Parallelized Algorithms
We noticed that right-to-left exponentiations are more suited for parallelization
than their left-to-right counterpart since more operations are independent. For
example in Alg. 2.2 one can first perform all squarings (step 5), store all values
corresponding to a di = 1, and then perform the remaining multiplications. We
present in Alg. 4.1 a right-to-left square always algorithm using (2) and two
parallel squaring blocks (i.e. two 1-operand multipliers). For a better readability
Alg. 4.1 is not atomic and two operations o1 and o2 performed simultaneously
are denoted o1 || o2.
Algorithm 4.2 is an atomic variant of Alg. 4.1. It requires two extra registers
compared to the non atomic version and the following matrices:
M =

1 1 5 6 5 5 5 0 1
0 6 4 3 0 1 3 1 1
2 5 3 1 5 5 5 0 0
2 5 0 6 0 1 5 0 1
 N = (1 1 05 2 2
)
It is possible to further enhance the efficiency of Alg. 4.1 if more memory is
available by storing more free squarings when 1’s sequences are processed. This
observation yields Alg. 4.3 which allows the storage of extramax simultaneous
precomputed squarings using as many registers R3, R4, . . .Rextramax+2. Alg. 4.3
with extramax = 1 is thus equivalent to algorithms 4.1 and 4.2. Though Alg. 4.3
is not atomic for readability reasons and because of the difficulty to write an
Alg. 4.1 Right-to-Left Parallel Square Always Exponentiation with (2)
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1 . . . d0)2, require 5 k-bit registers a, b, R0, R1, R2
Output: md mod n
1: a← 1 ; b← m ; extra← 0
2: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
3: if di = 1 then
4: if extra = 0 then
5: R0 ← (a− b)2 mod n || R1 ← b2 mod n
6: a← (a + b)2 mod n || R2 ← R12 mod n
7: a← (a−R0)/4 mod n
8: b← R1
9: R1 ← R2
10: extra← 1
11: else
12: R0 ← (a− b)2 mod n || a← (a + b)2 mod n
13: a← (a−R0)/4 mod n
14: b← R1
15: extra← 0
16: else
17: if extra = 0 then
18: b← b2 mod n
19: else
20: b← R1
21: extra← 0
22: return a
Alg. 4.2 Right-to-Left Atomic Parallel Square Always Exp. with (2)
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2, require 7 k-bit registers R0 to R6
Output: md mod n
1: R0 ← 1 ; R1 ← m ; v ← (0, 0, 0) ; u← 1 [v0 is i and v1 is extra from Alg. 4.1]
2: while v0 ≤ k − 1 do
3: j ← dv0(v1 + u + 1)
4: R5 ← (R0 −R1)/2 mod n
5: R6 ← (R0 + R1)/2 mod n
6: RMj,0 ← RMj,12 mod n || RMj,2 ← RMj,32 mod n
7: RMj,4 ← R0 −R2 mod n
8: RMj,5 ← R3
9: RMj,6 ← R4
10: v1 ←Mj,7
11: u←Mj,8
12: t← 1− v1(1− dv0+1)
13: RNt,0 ← R3
14: vNt,1 ← 0
15: vNt,2 ← vNt,2 + 1
16: v0 ← v0 + u
17: return R0
atomic algorithm depending on a variable (here extramax), it should be possible
to write an atomic version for each extramax value in the same way than we
processed with Alg. 4.1.
Alg. 4.3 Right-to-Left Generalized Parallel Square Always Exp. with (2)
Input: m,n ∈ N, m < n, d = (dk−1dk−2 . . . d0)2, extramax ∈ N∗, require extramax+4
k-bit registers a, R0, R1, . . .Rextramax+2
Output: md mod n
1: a← 1 ; R1 ← m ; extra← 0
2: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
3: if di = 1 then
4: if extra < extramax then
5: R0 ← (a−R1)2 mod n || Rextra+2 ← Rextra+12 mod n
6: a← (a + R1)2 mod n || Rextra+3 ← Rextra+22 mod n
7: a← (a−R0)/4 mod n
8: (R1, R2, . . . Rextramax+1)← (R2, R3, . . . Rextramax+2)
9: extra← extra+1
10: else
11: R0 ← (a−R1)2 mod n || a← (a + R1)2 mod n
12: a← (a−R0)/4 mod n
13: (R1, R2, . . . Rextramax+1)← (R2, R3, . . . Rextramax+2)
14: extra← extra−1
15: else
16: if extra = 0 then
17: R1 ← R12 mod n
18: else
19: (R1, R2, . . . Rextramax+1)← (R2, R3, . . . Rextramax+2)
20: extra← extra−1
21: return a
Remark Notice that multiple assignments of steps 8, 13, and 19 may be traded
for a cheap index increment if registers R1, R2, . . . , Rextramax+2 are managed as
a cyclic buffer.
4.2 Cost of Parallelized Algorithms
We demonstrate in Appendix A that, as the length of the exponent tends to
infinity, the cost per exponent bit of Alg. 4.3 tends to:(
1 +
1
4 extramax+2
)
S
It yields a cost of 7S/6 for Alg. 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 with extramax = 1, 11S/10 for
extramax = 2, 15S/14 for extramax = 3, etc. The difference between this limit
and costs actually observed in our simulations is negligible for 1024-bit or longer
exponents.
It is remarkable that if S/M = 0.8 these costs become respectively 0.93M ,
0.88M , 0.86M , etc. per exponent bit. We believe that such performances cannot
be achieved by binary algorithms using two parallelized 2-operands multiplica-
tion blocks. Indeed at least k multiplications have to be performed sequentially
in Alg. 2.1 and 2.2, which requires at least 1M per exponent bit. Moreover when
extramax tends to infinity, the cost of Alg. 4.3 tends to 1S, which we believe
to be the optimal cost of an exponentiation algorithm based on the binary de-
composition of the exponent since k squarings at least have to be performed
sequentially.
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical cost of parallelized algorithms cited in
this study.
Table 2. Comparison of the expected cost of parallelized exponentiation algorithms
Algorithm General cost S/M = 1 S/M = 0.8
Parallelized Montgomery ladder 1M 1M 1M
Alg. 4.1, Alg. 4.2, Alg. 4.3 with extramax = 1 7S/6 1.17M 0.93M
Alg. 4.3 with extramax = 2 11S/10 1.10M 0.88M
Alg. 4.3 with extramax = 3 15S/14 1.07M 0.86M
...
...
...
...
Alg. 4.3 with extramax→∞ 1S 1M 0.8M
5 Practical Results
In this section, we briefly present practical implementation results of the non-
parallelized square always algorithm. As discussed in Section 3.4 we focused the
right-to-left version.
We implemented this algorithm and the Montgomery ladder on an Atmel
AT90SC smart card chip. This component is provided with an 8-bit AVR core
and the AdvX coprocessor dedicated to long integer arithmetic. We used the
Barrett reduction [3] to implement modular arithmetic.
We present in Table 3 the memory (code and RAM) and timing figures
obtained with the chip and the AdvX running at 30 MHz. The observed speed-
up of the square always algorithm over the Montgomery ladder is 5% on average.
This is less than the predicted 11% but the difference can be explained by the
neglected operations of the atomic pattern. Keep in mind that such results highly
depend on the considered device and its hardware capabilities.
We performed careful SPA on both implementations and observed no leakage
on power traces.
Table 3. On chip comparison of the Montgomery ladder and square always algorithms
Algorithm Key Length (b) Code Size (B) RAM used (B) Timings (ms)
Montgomery ladder
(Alg. 2.3)
512 360 128 30
1024 360 256 200
2048 360 512 1840
Square Always
(Alg. 3.2)
512 510 192 28
1024 510 384 190
2048 510 768 1740
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that trading multiplications for squarings in an exponen-
tiation scheme together with the atomicity principle provides a new countermea-
sure against side-channel attacks aimed at distinguishing squarings from mul-
tiplications. Moreover, this countermeasure is intrinsically more secure against
such analysis than the classical multiply always atomic algorithm with exponent
blinding, and provides better performances and flexibility towards space/time
trade-offs than regular algorithms such as the Montgomery ladder or the square-
and-multiply always.
As a complementary work, we present new algorithms using two parallel
squaring blocks, and show how to write them atomically. We point out that, as
far as we know, it leads to the fastest results in terms of speed. On the hardware
side, an interesting conclusion is that two parallel squaring blocks enable faster
exponentiation algorithms than two parallel multiplication blocks.
We believe that these observations are of great interest for the embedded
devices industry and for everyone looking for fast exponentiation.
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A Cost of Algorithm 4.3
We present hereafter a demonstration of the claimed asymptotic cost of Alg. 4.3.
We first recall the principle of this algorithm: since 3 squarings are required
to process a 1 bit, a fourth squaring slot is available at the same cost (2S).
Thus, the algorithm scans the exponent from the right to the left and computes
one squaring in advance at each 1 bit (↗ in the following), within the limit
of extramax. Then, as 0’s are processed, the free squarings are consumed (↘)
at null cost (0S). Two other cases may happen: first, a 1 bit can be processed
but extramax squarings are already stored in registers, then one free squaring is
consumed (↘) and 1S is enough to perform the two other squarings. Second, a
0 bit can be processed with no free squaring in registers (extra = 0). Only in this
latter case one squaring is performed at the cost of 1S and the parallel squaring
slot is wasted (→).
We can consider the evolution of extra as exponent bits are processed using a
diagram as below. For example, we have represented here the evolution of extra
for the 5 first bits of an exponent d = (dk−1 . . . 00110)2 with extramax ≥ 2. The
cost of the first 0 bit is 1S since extra = 0 at the beginning of the exponentiation,
the cost of two next 1 bits is 2S each and extra is incremented, finally the two
last 0 bits have cost 0S and extra is decremented. The total cost of the 5 bits is
5S.
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Observe now that the same bits have a higher cost if extramax = 1: as
previously the two first bits 01 cost 1S and 2S respectively. However, the next 1
bit cannot lead to the computation of a second free squaring since extramax = 1.
So the bit is processed at the cost of 1S and the free squaring is lost. Finally,
the two last 0’s cost 1S each since no free squaring is stored anymore. The cost
of the sequence is 6S.
0
extramax = 1
bit: 0 1 2 3 4 5 . . . k − 1
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 1 @
@R
1
-0 -0
For a given exponent and extramax, let’s call a c-cycle a sequence of bits
starting with extra = c, ending with extra = c, and inside which extra > c.
In particular, we can decompose any exponent as a sequence of 0-cycles, except
that the last one may be unterminated with extra > 0.
Then, letBec stand for the expected number of bits of a c-cycle when extramax =
e and Cec its expected cost.
extramax = 1 For a random exponent and extramax = 1, a 0-cycle is “0”
with probability 1/2 and “1x”, x ∈ {0, 1} otherwise. The cost of a 0-cycle “0” is
1S and the cost of a 0-cycle “1x” is 2S if x = 0 which happens with probability
1/2, or 3S if x = 1.
B10 = 1/2× 1 + 1/2× 2 = 3/2
C10 = 1/2× 1S + 1/2× (1/2× 2S + 1/2× 3S) = 7S/4
The expected cost of a 0-cycle with extramax = 1 is then C10/B
1
0 = 7S/6
per bit. As the length of the exponent tends to infinity, the contribution of the
possibly unterminated last 0-cycle becomes negligible. Therefore the cost per bit
of a random exponent tends to the cost per bit of a 0-cycle as its length tends to
infinity. So we can approximate the cost of algorithms 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 to 7S/6
for exponents of thousands of bits.
extramax = e A 0-cycle starts with a 0 with probability 1/2 and with a 1
otherwise. In the first case its cost is 1S as previously. Let B˜ec , respectively C˜
e
c ,
denote the expected length, respectively the expected cost, of a c-cycle starting
with a 1 bit when extramax = e.
Be0 = 1/2× 1 + 1/2× B˜e0 (3)
Ce0 = 1/2× 1S + 1/2× C˜e0 (4)
First we demonstrate that B˜e0 = 2e. As depicted below, one can observe that
B˜e0 = B˜
e+1
1 .
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As depicted hereafter, the length B˜e+10 of a 0-cycle with extramax = e + 1
and starting by a 1 bit is sB˜e+11 + 2 where s is the number of inner 1-cycles
starting by a 1 bit. Notice also that s = i with probability 2−(i+1), which gives:
B˜e+10 = 2 +
∞∑
i=0
iB˜e+11
2(i+1)
= 2 + B˜e+11 = 2 + B˜
e
0
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(B˜e0)e≥1 is thus an arithmetic progression with common difference 2 and
B˜10 = 2. This yields B˜
e
0 = 2e.
In a same manner, we can observe that:
C˜e+10 = 2S +
∞∑
i=0
iC˜e+11
2(i+1)
= 2S + C˜e+11 = 2S + C˜
e
0
Since C˜10 = 5S/2 we obtain that C˜
e
0 = (1/2 + 2e)S.
Using the above results in equations (3) and (4), we obtain finally:
Be0 = 1/2× 1 + 1/2× 2e = 1/2 + e
and Ce0 = 1/2× 1S + 1/2× (1/2 + 2e)S = (3/4 + e)S
The expectation of the cost per bit of a 0-cycle is then:
Ce0
Be0
=
(
3/4 + e
1/2 + e
)
S =
(
1 +
1
4e+ 2
)
S
Therefore the expectation of the cost of Alg. 4.3 with extramax = e tends
then to (1 + 14e+2 )S as the length of the exponent tends to infinity.
